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Having an intention to act is commonly operationalized as the moment at which
awareness of an urge or decision to act arises. Measuring this moment has been
challenging due to the dependence on first-person reports of subjective experience
rather than objective behavioral or neural measurements. Commonly, this challenge is
met using (variants of) Libet’s clock method. In 2008, Matsuhashi and Hallett published
a novel probing strategy as an alternative to the clock method. We believe their probe
method could provide a valuable addition to the clock method because: it measures
the timing of an intention in real-time, it can be combined with additional (tactile, visual or
auditory) stimuli to create a more ecologically valid experimental context, and it allows the
measurement of the point of no return. Yet to this date, the probe method has not been
applied widely - possibly due to concerns about the effects that the probes might have
on the intention and/or action preparation processes. To address these concerns, a 2 ×
2 within-subject design is tested. In this design, two variables are manipulated: (1) the
requirement of an introspection report and (2) the presence of an auditory probe. Three
observables are measured that provide information about the timing of an intention to
act: (1) awareness reports of the subjective experience of having an intention, (2) neural
preparatory activity for action, and (3) behavioral data of the performed actions. The
presence of probes was found to speed upmean action times by roughly 300 ms, but did
not alter the neural preparation for action. The requirement of an introspection report did
influence brain signals: reducing the amplitude of the readiness potential and increasing
the desynchronization in the alpha and beta bands over the motor cortex prior to action
onset. By discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the probe method compared
to the clock method, we hope to demonstrate its added value and promote its use in
future research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Having an intention to act is commonly operationalized as the moment at which awareness of an
urge or decision to act arises (Libet et al., 1983; Lau et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al.,
2011; Tabu et al., 2015; Alexander et al., 2016). Measuring this moment has been challenging
due to the dependence on first-person reports of subjective experience rather than objective
behavioral or neural measurements (Wolpe and Rowe, 2014; Haggard, 2019). A popular method
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tomeasure the timing of an intention to act is the clockmethod of
Libet et al. (1983). This method instructs participants to look at a
clock and remember its configuration as soon as they experience
an intention to act. This configuration is to be remembered and
reported after the action has been performed. Variants of this
paradigm use a stream of letters (Soon et al., 2008, 2013; Bode
et al., 2011) instead of a traditional clock. Although this method
is widely applied (Dominik et al., 2018; Saigle et al., 2018), it has
been criticized repeatedly (Haggard, 2008; Nachev and Hacker,
2014; Navon, 2014; Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). Major critiques
concern the requirement of constant introspection, the post-hoc
nature of the intention reports and the ecological validity of the
experimental task.
In 2008, Matsuhashi and Hallett came up with an alternative
to the clock method. They invented a novel probing strategy to
measure the experienced timing of an intention to act. Their
strategy uses auditory probes that are presented to a participant
at random points in time. These probes trigger a report on
the awareness of an intention to act through a behavioral
response. When a probe is presented and the participant is
experiencing an intention, they need to refrain from acting (i.e.,
veto) and wait. Alternatively, when a probe is presented when
they are not intending to act, they should simply ignore the
probe and continue their self-paced actions. By comparing the
timing of probes and consequent actions, one can determine
during which time period the participant was aware of their
intention to act.
We believe the probe method of Matsuhashi and Hallett
(2008) provides a valuable addition to the popular clock method
of Libet et al. (1983) for several reasons. First of all, the probe
method does not require constant introspection: participants
need to perform introspection only for a brief moment in
response to a probe. Secondly, the probes are presented during
action preparation, measuring the timing of an intention to act in
real-time rather than post-hoc after action performance. Thirdly,
the probe method can easily be used in combination with other
visual or tactile stimuli. This provides the opportunity to use
this method within a more complex environment and study a
more ecologically valid experimental task. This way, the probe
method can broaden our methodological repertoire so we can
study intentional actions under various circumstances. Fourth,
in addition to the timing of an intention to act, the probe method
measures the point of no return (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
This point of no return indicates until what time one is still able
to veto an intended act.
Although the probe method of Matsuhashi and Hallett
provides a valuable addition to the conventional clock method,
it has not been applied widely. To the best of our knowledge,
only one investigation (by us) has used this method since
(Verbaarschot et al., 2016). The vast majority of researchers
use the clock method to investigate the timing of an intention:
Alexander et al. (2016), Banks and Isham (2009), Bode et al.
(2011), Fried et al. (2011), Douglas et al. (2015), Haggard and
Eimer (1999), Haggard et al. (2002), Keller and Heckhausen
(1990), Miller et al. (2011), Jo et al. (2014), Lau et al. (2007),
Rigoni et al. (2011), Schlegel et al. (2013), Schneider et al. (2013),
Sirigu et al. (2004), Soon et al. (2008), Soon et al. (2013), Tabu
et al. (2015), Wohlschläger et al. (2003), etc. Perhaps this is
due to the fact that, while the clock method is not without
problems, the probe method has some concerns of its own. These
concerns mainly involve the effect that the probes might have
on the experienced awareness of an intention to act, the timing
of the performed actions and the underlying neural activity (as
described in detail below). In order to address these concerns, a
2x2 within-subject design is tested. In this design, two variables
are manipulated: (1) the requirement of an introspection report
and (2) the presence of an auditory probe.
Three observables are measured that provide information
about the timing of an intention to act: (1) awareness reports
of the subjective experience of having an intention, (2) neural
preparatory activity for action, and (3) behavioral data of the
performed actions. The measured intention reports can consist
of a post-hoc report on the vividness of an experienced intention,
analog to the required constant introspection of the clock
method (Libet et al., 1983). Alternatively, it can consist of
the response to an auditory probe (i.e., ignore the probe or
veto the action), as used in the probe method of Matsuhashi
and Hallett (2008). The neural preparatory activity for action
is recorded using an electro-encephalogram (EEG). Both the
readiness potential (RP) and event-related desynchronization
in the alpha (8–12 Hz) and beta (13–30 Hz) bands over the
motor cortex prior to action are investigated. Both signatures
have been reported to correlate with voluntary movement in
previous research (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Pfurtscheller
and Aranibar, 1979; Libet et al., 1983; Doyle et al., 2005; Shibasaki
and Hallett, 2006; Bai et al., 2011; Lew et al., 2012; Khalighinejad
et al., 2018). The performed actions are measured through the
timing of button presses and an electro-myogram (EMG) of the
relevant arm-muscles.
Post-hoc, we investigated the brain activity prior to ignored
and vetoed probes. When a probe is ignored, it means that the
participant did not experience an intention to act at probe onset.
We know that the RP has its onset up to 2s prior to action,
whereas the awareness of an intention is reported up to 1.5s prior
to action using the probe method (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
This means that if a participant ignores a probe, one would expect
no or a very weak RP prior to probe onset. However, when a
probe is vetoed and the participant was experiencing an intention
to act, one would expect to see an RP prior to probe onset. In this
case the RP is time-locked to probe onset, therefore we expect
it to be less pronounced (i.e., smaller amplitude) than when it
would be time-locked to action onset. If we find an RP prior
to vetoed probes and not prior to ignored probes, this would
provide further credence to the probe method as an accurate tool
for measuring the timing of an intention to act.
Before going into the details of our experiment, the next
section (2) will provide additional background on the clock
and probe methods. Section 3 describes our experiment which
quantifies the concerns about the probe method by assessing the
individual effects of the manipulated variables on each of the
observables. Section 4 will compare the strengths and weaknesses
of the probe method to those of the clock method. By addressing
concerns and explicating the added value of the probe method,
we hope to promote its use in future research.
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2. COMPARING PROBES AND CLOCKS
Participants in studies that use the clock or probe method usually
perform a similar motor task: a spontaneous action (e.g., a button
press or brisk flexion of the hand) that is made by the participant
whenever they experience an intention to do so. The difference
between these methods is in the way they collect a report on the
timing of an intention to act: see Figure 1. The clock method
instructs participants to remember and report the configuration
of a clock at the time of their experienced intention. The probe
method uses auditory beeps to probe the participant at different
moments in time for their awareness of an intention.
The probe and clock methods each have their strengths and
weaknesses. First of all, the clock method requires participants
to remember and report the onset of their intention after
action performance Libet et al. (1983). This post-hoc method
of gathering first-person reports seems prone to inaccuracies
(Wolpe and Rowe, 2014). Moreover, the reported intention
timings seem to be heavily influenced by the perceived action
onset and/or the consequences of acting (Banks and Isham,
2009). The probe method measures the awareness of an intention
on the spot. Participants need to respond immediately to a probe
and have no need to retain the exact onset of their intention to
act. Furthermore, since the awareness of an intention is measured
prior to action performance, its timing cannot be influenced by
the act itself or any of its potential consequences.
Second, the clock method requires continuous introspection:
participants need to tune into their conscious experience to detect
the slightest trace of an urge to act. This requirement seems to
have an effect on the neural signatures that can be observed at
that time (Lau et al., 2007). The probe method requires sporadic
introspection: participants need to perform introspection for a
brief moment in time in response to a probe. This happens once
during a trial at most.
Third, the clock method requires an explicit intention report
from a participant: participants are instructed to track the onset
of their intention to act and remember and report its timing.
Explicit awareness of an intention to perform a spontaneous
(motor) action is not something we usually exhibit in our daily
life. Requiring this awareness seems quite artificial. In contrast,
the probe method uses the behavioral response to a probe to infer
the time course of an intention to act. This implicit intention
report softens the constraints on the level of awareness that is
needed to perform the task. This situation seems similar to one
in everyday life where we can explain our intentions when asked
by someone.
FIGURE 1 | Comparison of the clock and probe methods.
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Fourth, the required type of intended action that is studied
by the clock and probe methods does not seem ecologically
valid. Most investigations involve simple spontaneous actions
like a self-paced hand movement (Libet et al., 1983; Sirigu
et al., 2004; Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008; Schlegel et al., 2013;
Douglas et al., 2015) or a decision to add or subtract a number
(Soon et al., 2013; Wisniewski et al., 2016). An alternative (more
ecologically valid) task is difficult to find for the clock method.
This is mostly due to the fact that it is difficult to combine
the clock method with additional stimuli because focus and
concentration is needed to observe a visually presented clock
and remember the time of the experienced intention to act. In
contrast, the probe method can easily be used in combination
with other visual or tactile stimuli. This provides the opportunity
to investigate the timing of an intention to act while performing
actions that could be performed in everyday life. For instance, a
recent study by Khalighinejad et al. (2018) made adaptations to a
conventional moving-dot task in order to measure meaningful
spontaneous hand movements. The target actions consist of
voluntary decisions to skip a trial. Their design could be used in
combination with the probe method to gain information on the
timing of the intention to skip.
Fifth, the clock method seems in line with a discrete
interpretation of an intention to act, whereas the probe method
seems more in line with a dynamic one. The clock method asks
participants to remember and report the moment at which they
are aware of an urge or decision to act. This seems to assume
that an intention is a discrete mental state that “pops up” in a
participants mind at a specific moment in time, or at least that
the awareness of that intention occurs at a discrete time (Uithol
et al., 2014). The probe method questions the participant across
a range in time, allowing a variety of moments at which one is
aware of an urge or decision to act. Furthermore, the average
onset of an intention to act measured with the probe method
seems to bemuch earlier (about 1.5 s prior to action performance;
see Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008; Verbaarschot et al., 2016) than
when it is measured with the clock method (about 0.15 s prior to
action; see Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Haggard
et al., 2002; Sirigu et al., 2004; Banks and Isham, 2009; Bode et al.,
2011; Fried et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2013; Jo et al., 2014; Douglas
et al., 2015; Tabu et al., 2015; Alexander et al., 2016). As argued
previously (Verbaarschot et al., 2016), these findings fit better
with the interpretation of an intention as a dynamic process
rather than a discrete mental state. Unlike the clock method,
the probe method can measure different stages in this process.
However, the success of this method does come at a cost: quite a
large amount of trials (±300) are required to get a good estimate
of the awareness of an intention to act for a single participant. In
contrast, the clock method provides a single-trial estimate of the
onset of an intention.
Sixth and last, in addition to the timing of an intention to act,
the probe method measures the point of no return (Matsuhashi
and Hallett, 2008). When a probe is presented close to action
onset, participants can no longer veto their action. According to
Matsuhashi and Hallett, this inability to refrain from acting in
response to a probe occurs around 0.13 s prior to action onset.
The point in time at which this happens is referred to as the point
of no return. Comparing the point of no return to the average
brain activity at that point in time provides the opportunity
to examine the stages of neural preparation for action after
which action execution becomes irreversible. Schultze-Kraft et al.
(2016), who found the point of no return at 200ms prior to action
onset, show that even after the onset of the Readiness Potential
and alpha/beta ERD one can still veto an intended act. The clock
method does not allow for any such analyses as it is unable to
capture the point of no return.
Although the probe method seems to be a valuable addition to
the clock method, it also raises some concerns. The requirement
of an introspection report and the presence of a probe could
potentially disrupt the “natural” process of intending to act in
unknown ways (see Figure 2A). We have identified six possible
scenarios that would invalidate the probe method as a tool to
measure the timing of an intention to act 1:
1. Probes speed up brain signals: in an experimental context in
which spontaneous actions are performed in absence of a clear
external stimulus on when to act, intentions to act may be
based largely on spontaneous fluctuations in neural activity
(Schurger et al., 2012). Whenever the neural activity crosses a
certain threshold, this results in an action. Threshold crossing
tends to happen at crests in the ongoing neural fluctuations.
Probes may affect these fluctuations and push them over
the threshold for action performance (see Figure 2B). This
influence may happen irrespective of the current stage of
development of the RP and alpha/beta ERD. If this is the case,
we expect to find more variance in these neural signatures
in conditions with probes (sound + probe) compared to
those without (control + introspect). On the other hand, the
neural signatures may be susceptible to probes only during
a specific stage in their development. If this is the case,
we expect to find a later onset of these signatures relative
to action performance in conditions with probes compared
to those without. Irrespective of these two cases: if probes
speed up brain signals, actions should speed up as well.
Therefore, we expect that in both these cases actions will
be faster in conditions with probes than those without. It
could be the case that probes affect brain signals only if
participants should pay attention to them. If this is the case,
we expect to find the differences described above in the probe
condition only.
2. Probes delay brain signals: rather than pushing the neural
fluctuations over the threshold for action performance, probes
may bring neural activations back to baseline level (see
Figure 2C). If this is the case, we expect to find more
variance in the RP and alpha/beta ERD in conditions with
probes (sound + probe) compared to those without (control
+ introspect). Moreover, we expect to find slower actions in
conditions with probes compared to those without. Again,
these effects may be specific to conditions in which the probe
matters for the task at hand. In that case, we expect to find
these differences in the probe condition only.
1We note that similar criticisms could be raised for the moving clock stimulus used
in Libet-type studies.
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of hypotheses. (A) Schematic overview of the (top:
brain) brain processes (e.g., RP), (middle: light bulb) experienced intentions
and (bottom: notebook) intention reports (e.g., through veto and ignore
responses to probes) prior to a spontaneous act. The gap in the distribution of
ignored probes is due to vetos: prior to action onset, participants are aware of
their intention and perform a veto in response to any probes that are presented
at this time. Shortly prior to action onset, ignored probes reappear in the
distribution: at this point, probes are presented so close to action onset that
participants are unable to veto. (B) Probes could speed up brain signals by
pushing the neural activity over the threshold for action. This should speed up
actions as well. (C) Probes could delay brain signals, bringing the neural
activity back to baseline. This should delay the actions. (D) Probes could
induce awareness of intending to act. In this case, probes would often elicit a
veto response, causing a sparse distribution of ignored probes that lacks a
clear gap. (E) Probes could also suppress the awareness of intending to act.
In this case, the distribution of ignored probes closely resembles the
underlying distribution of scheduled probes. A clear gap due to consistent veto
responses is missing.
3. Probes induce awareness: the presentation of a probe may
enhance the awareness of an intention to act or even cause an
intention to act (see Figure 2D). If this is the case, almost all
probes in the probe condition should result in a veto response.
This would cause the distribution of ignored probes to look
sparse.
4. Probes suppress awareness: probes may also suppress
awareness of an intention to act (see Figure 2E). In this case,
probes should almost never result in a veto response in the
probe condition. The distribution of ignored probes should
look very similar to the distribution of scheduled probes.
5. Veto influences action: participants may dislike the required
veto response and may therefore attempt to act before a probe
is presented. In this case, actions should be performed faster
in the probe condition compared to the other conditions.
6. Inaccurate intention report: participants may simply not be
able to report their intentions to act using the probes. In
this case, veto’s are expected to be performed randomly in
response to a probe. In this case, the distribution of ignored
probes of the probe condition should look quite similar to the
distribution of scheduled probes: there is no clear time range
during which vetos are consistently performed.
To quantify these six concerns, each scenario is tested using the
methods described in the next section.
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
3.1. Participants
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards provided by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. The
study protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee of
Faculty of Social Sciences of the Radboud University Nijmegen.
A total of 21 healthy participants (15 females, mean age: 26 years
old, youngest participant: 19 year old, oldest participant: 55 years
old) volunteered to perform the experiment with their written
informed consent. All participants were right-handed and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants received€25
or 2.5 course credits for their participation.
Five participants were excluded from the analysis. One
participant reported to suffer from a brain disease that affects
the amount of blood vessels present in the brain. Since it is
unknown how this disease might affect their brain activity or
behavior in this experiment, it was decided to exclude this
participant from further analysis. Another participant reported
to be nauseous during the experiment and could not sit still.
Due to the large amount of resulting movement artifacts in the
EEG data, this participant was excluded from further analysis.
Similarly, manymovement artifacts were found in the data of one
other participant, leading to their exclusion from further analysis.
Two participants did not follow instructions correctly, as was
apparent from their answers to a post-experiment questionnaire.
They were also excluded from analysis. The data of the remaining
16 participants was analyzed.
3.2. Experimental Procedure
The experiment consisted of a 2 × 2 within subject-design
in which the following variables were manipulated: (1) the
requirement of an introspection report and (2) the presence of
an auditory probe. The main task of the participants, underlying
each of the four conditions, was to press a button with the
index finger of their right hand whenever they wanted to,
similar to Libet et al. (1983) and Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008).
Participants were instructed not to plan their actions, but press
the button as soon as they felt an intention to do so. While
performing these self-paced spontaneous actions, participants
were instructed to look at a fixation cross that was displayed
at the center of a computer screen. As long as the fixation
cross was present, participants were instructed to relax, rest their
arms and hands in between button presses and blink as little
as possible.
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When there are no reasons for deciding when to act other
than a spontaneous intention to do so, it is challenging to prevent
participants from acting as soon as possible (i.e., within the first 2
s of a trial). In Libet-type experiments this is done by instructing
participants to wait for at least one full revolution of the clock
before acting (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 1999).
Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) instructed participants to perform
their actions at intervals of roughly 5–10 s, without planning their
actions or keeping time. When the action intervals were too long
or short, participants were notified by the experimenter. Because
details are missing on exactly when and how the participants
were notified during the experiment of Matsuhashi and Hallett
(2008), we achieved the action interval of 5-10 s using trial-by-
trial color feedback: immediately at every button press, the color
of the fixation cross changed for 1 s before the cross disappeared.
If it turned blue, the action was made too slow; if it turned red,
the action was made too fast; and if it turned green the action
timing was perfect. The participant was instructed to adjust the
timing of their button-presses depending on the color feedback.
In this way, participants had no need to keep track of time,
but could rely on the color feedback. The trained action timing
provided a window of opportunity of about 5 s. During this time
window, participants were free to perform a spontaneous act.
This window ensured that there would be enough data for the
subsequent EEG analysis and sufficient time to present a probe
prior to action onset.
On top of the main task of performing self-paced button
presses, each of the two independent variables were individually
manipulated. This resulted in the following four experimental
conditions (visualized in Figure 3):
1. Control: participants performed the main task of pressing
a button at their own pace roughly every 5–10 s. An
introspection report on their experienced intention was not
required. This was the most basic condition as it consisted
solely of the performance of spontaneous voluntary actions.
With no additional stimuli or mental tasks, this condition
provided pure control data for the timing of intended actions
and their preceding neurological signals.
2. Sound: in addition to the main task, an auditory probe was
presented at random times. Participants were instructed to
ignore this probe completely because it has no importance
to the experiment. Again, an introspection report on their
experienced intention was not required. This condition
allowed the investigation of any potential effects of the added
auditory stimuli on the neural preparation for action, the
awareness of an intention and the action itself.
3. Introspect: This condition did not involve any probes, but did
require an introspection report. In addition to the main task,
participants were instructed to focus their attention on the
first moment at which they felt the urge to press the button.
Immediately at every button press, the following multiple-
choice question was presented: “How did you experience your
intention to act?”. Participants could answer this question by
pressing one of three buttons corresponding to the following
answer options: “vivid and conscious,” “a vague feeling of
wanting” or “pressed the button without thinking about it.”
FIGURE 3 | Overview of experimental conditions. In all conditions, participants
were pressing a button at their own pace. In addition, the sound and probe
conditions presented an auditory probe to participants at pseudo-random
moments in time. The introspect and probe conditions both required a report
on the awareness of an intention to act. In the introspect condition, participants
needed to report post-hoc how vividly they experienced their intention to act.
In the probe condition, participant needed to veto their action in response to a
probe when at that time they were aware of their intention to act.
To prevent action preparation prior to the presentation of
this question, the order of these answer options was set
randomly at the start of each trial. Using these instructions and
questions, participants were required to maintain a constant
meta-awareness of their intention to act. This requirement
mimicked the level of introspection required in a Libet-type
experiment (Libet et al., 1983) and allowed the investigation
of any effects of the pure introspection task - without the
additional visual stimuli and memory tasks required by the
clock method. Color feedback on action timing was provided
immediately after answering the multiple-choice question.
4. Probe: in addition to the main task, an auditory probe was
presented at random times and an introspection report was
required. When the probe is presented while (1) they had an
intention to act: they should veto the intended act (i.e., not
press the button) and wait for the fixation cross to disappear.
Alternatively, when a probe is presented while (2) they did
not have an intention to act: they should ignore the probe and
press the button whenever they wanted to. These instructions
were a direct replication from Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008).
Whenever a trial ended without a button press, the question
“did you intend to act at the time you heard the beep?”
was presented. The participant could answer this multiple-
choice question with either “yes” or “no.” To prevent action
preparation prior to the presentation of this question, the
order of these answer options was determined randomly at
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the start of each trial. This question was presented in order
to distinguish a veto from the absence of a button press
(i.e., the trial ended before the participant experienced an
intention to act). The subjective experience of an intention
was reported indirectly through the behavioral response (i.e.,
veto or ignore) to a probe and was confirmed by answering the
question at the end of a trial. This was the core condition that
implemented the full probe method. Color feedback on action
timing was provided immediately at each button press or, in
case a trial ended without a button press, after answering the
multiple-choice question.
At the end of the experiment, participants 8 to 21 completed
a short questionnaire in order to gain more insight into
their subjective experience during the experiment. The
questionnaire consisted of the following seven questions
(translated from Dutch):
1. Did you act spontaneously?
a. Yes, I pressed the button as soon as I wanted to
b. No, long before I pressed the button, I already decided to
act
2. Was the difference between the tasks clear?
a. Yes
b. No
3. What did you think about the beeps?
a. Annoying
b. Neutral
c. Stressful
d. Other: ...
4. Was it difficult to determine whether you had an intention to
act at the time you heard the beep?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Sometimes
5. How did you decide whether you could press the button after
you heard a beep?
6. Was there a clear difference between themoment at which you
had an intention to press the button and the moment at which
you pressed the button?
a. Yes, the intention to press the button was clearly
distinguishable from the button press itself
b. No, the intention to press the button occurred at the same
time as the button press
c. Other: ...
7. Did the beeps influence your intention to press the button?
a. No
b. Yes, because: ...
3.3. Stimuli
The participant was seated on a comfortable chair in front of a
table inside a quiet room. The instructions and visual stimuli were
displayed using a 17 inch TFT screen with a resolution of 800 by
600 pixels and a refresh rate of 60Hz that was placed roughly at
70cm directly in front of the participant. In-ear headphones were
used to present the auditory probes. A button box containing a
total of four buttons was used to perform the self-paced button
presses and answer the questions in the introspect and probe
conditions. The experiment was run in BrainStream 2.
The auditory probe consisted of a short “beep” that was
created in Matlab 3. The probe had a frequency of 1200 Hz
and duration of 0.04 s. Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) state that
“Tones were applied pseudo-randomly at intervals of 3–20 s,
controlled by one of the investigators in a way that was not
predictable by the subjects” (pp. 2345–2346). However, because
further details on the exact timing of the probes are missing,
these probes times are not replicable. For this reason we designed
our own probe distribution. The timing of our probes are pre-
determined on the basis of 25 control trials that were collected
during a training block at the start of the experiment. The
probe onsets ranged from 0.5 s before the average action time
plus and minus one standard deviation. Within this interval,
auditory probes followed a truncated normal distribution such
that most probes were presented before the average action time
(see Figure 4). A minimum probe interval of 3 s before the
average action time was ensured. Moreover, the probe interval
was ensured to start at least 3 s after trial onset. As well as
being explicable, this probe distribution was designed to optimize
experimental efficiency by ensuring that approximately one third
of all trials would present a probe within 3 s before movement
onset (during which awareness of an intention to act is most
likely to occur). Both the sound and probe conditions used the
exact same probe distribution per participant. Every trial in the
sound or probe conditions could contain maximally one probe.
Depending on the participants action time, this probe may or
may not be presented on a certain trial.
The color feedback was slightly random. The fixation cross
turned red (i.e., too fast) if the button press was made within the
first 5 s after trial start + a random time interval between 0 and 3s.
The fixation cross turned blue (i.e., too slow) if the button press
occurs more than 10 s after trial start + a random time interval
between 0 to 3 s. In all other cases where a button press was made,
the fixation cross turned green. This means that the boundaries
between each feedback color were blurred by 0–3 s. These blurred
boundaries within the color feedback were designed to encourage
the element of spontaneity. Theymade it difficult for a participant
to count time or otherwise plan their actions to perform them at
a “correct” time. Instead, they needed to refrain from planning
and focus on their intention to act within the learned window
of opportunity.
The presentation of the fixation cross marked the start of
a trial. Each trial had a maximum duration of 9 to 14 s. The
exact trial duration was chosen randomly at the start of each
trial. A trial ended either because the participant had pressed the
button or because the maximum trial duration was reached. The
2see www.brainstream.nu
3see www.mathworks.com
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FIGURE 4 | Example probe distribution. Here, the measured action times during training have a mean of 5.563 s (mean AT) and a standard deviation of 1.513 s (std
AT). Probes are sampled from a normal distribution with a mean of mean AT - std AT - 0.5 and a standard deviation equal to std AT. The sampled probe onsets follow
a truncated normal distribution within the interval of 0.5s before the average action time plus and minus one standard deviation.
inter trial interval was chosen randomly between 1.5 and 3 s on
each trial.
3.4. Experimental Timeline
At the start of the experiment, participants performed two
training blocks. The first block consisted of 20 control trials and
was used to train participants on the main task of pressing a
button whenever they wanted to. This block was repeated until
the participant performed the desired actions at roughly the right
time interval. The second block consisted of 25 control trials and
was used to collect the action times required to set the time
distribution of the probes. The remainder of the experiment
consisted of 4 test sequences. Each test sequence consisted of
4 blocks of 25 trials of each condition in a random order. The
type of condition was displayed to the participant prior to each
sequence of 25 trials of a single condition. In total, 100 trials were
acquired per condition.
The experiment took 1.5 to 2 hours + 0.5 hours for setting
up the EEG, which resulted in a maximum total duration
of 2.5hours.
3.5. Behavioral Data
Three behavioral measurements were collected during the
experiment: (1) the introspection reports, (2) the timing of the
performed actions and (3) the answers to the questionnaire. In
the introspect condition, the introspection reports consisted of
the experienced vividness of the intention to act. In the probe
condition they consisted of a behavioral response to a probe (a
veto or ignore) and its confirmation at the end of a trial. The
action timing was measured using the button presses and the
onset of muscle activation as recorded with an EMG.
In order to quantify hypotheses 3, 4 and 6 (see Section 2), we
needed to determine whether the probes in the probe condition
lead to veto responses across a consistent time range prior to
action onset. In other words: is there a gap in the distribution
of ignored probes, as illustrated in Figure 2A and found by
Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008)? To answer this question, the
timing of the ignored and scheduled probes relative to action
onset was analyzed. The distribution of scheduled probes refers
to the average amount of probes that should by design occur prior
to action onset, as described in Section 3.3. Since participants
performed self-paced actions during the experiment, one could
not predict their exact action onsets. Therefore, the amount of
probes that were actually presented prior to action onset will
always differ a bit from the scheduled ones. The distribution of
ignored probes is a sample from the scheduled probe distribution
that shows how many of the scheduled probes were actually
presented and ignored by the participant.
To determine the distribution of scheduled probes relative
to action onset, the scheduled probe onsets that precede each
individual action were sampled per participant. Subsequently, the
action onset was subtracted from each corresponding sampled
probe onset in order to calculate the probe timing relative to
action onset. A histogram with 33 time bins of 150 ms, running
from 5 s prior to action until action onset, was constructed
of the scheduled probe timings. In order to get an estimate of
the average number of scheduled probes per participant, the
histogram of scheduled probes was divided by the total number
of performed actions. In addition, a histogram was created of the
ignored probe times (probes that were followed by an action at a
later point in time) using identical time bins. Lastly, the mean
distribution of scheduled and ignored probes was calculated
across all participants. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon,
1945) was used to assess whether the values of each time bin differ
significantly between the ignored and scheduled probes across
participants. The alpha-level for significance was Bonferroni
corrected and set at 0.05/33 = 0.0015. The consecutive time
points at which the number of ignored probes were found
to be significantly less than the number of scheduled probes
define a time range during which participants were on average
aware of their intention to act (see Figure 6). As a control,
these steps were repeated for the sound condition (which should
not show a gap in the distribution of ignored probes prior to
action onset).
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The EMG measurement served to check the accuracy of the
button presses. The EMG was recorded using two electrodes,
placed in a bipolar pair on the right wrist and the center of
the right forearm (on the flexor pollicis longus). For analysis,
the EMG data of the bipolar electrodes was subtracted and
band-pass filtered between 51 and 250 Hz. Subsequently, the
absolute value was taken and the data was sliced in epochs of
4 s prior to a button press until 1 s after. For each participant,
the average EMG activity was calculated across all trials. From
this average the median and standard deviation were calculated
for each participant over all time points. An individual threshold
for muscle activation was set at the median EMG activity plus
2x its standard deviation. The average onset of muscle activity
was determined as the point in time at which the average EMG
activity exceeded the set threshold.
The mean and standard deviation of the action times relative
to trial start were calculated for each participant. To quantify
hypotheses 1, 2, and 5 (see Section 2), a two-factor within-
subject repeated measures ANOVA was used to assess any
significant effects of the manipulated variables on the mean
and standard deviation of the action times between conditions.
The two factors are: (1) the requirement of an introspection
report and (2) the presence of probes. By using a Bonferroni
correction for these two factors and their potential interaction,
the significance level was set to 0.025/3 = 0.008 for a two-
sided significance test. When a main effect of either manipulated
variable was found, individual post-hoc paired-samples t-tests
were used to assess specific differences in action mean or
standard deviation between conditions. The significance level
of these individual tests was set to 0.025 for a two-sided
significance test.
In addition, the relation between probes and actions was
investigated by looking at differences between conditions in
action times relative to probe onset. In order to calculate the
action times of the control and introspect conditions relative to
probe onset, the same probe distribution was used as presented in
the sound condition. These simulated probe onsets—button press
times represent the absence of a connection between probes and
actions in the control and introspect conditions and served as a
control for the sound condition in which such a relation may be
present. Differences in actionmean or standard deviation relative
to probe onset were assessed using a paired-sample t-test on all
three possible combinations of the control, introspect and sound
conditions. The significance level was set to 0.025/3 = 0.008. The
probe condition was left out of this analysis since it would differ
by design from all other conditions due to the performed veto
responses: creating a potential gap in the distribution of ignored
probes, as illustrated in Figure 2A.
3.6. Brain Data
EEG data was collected using 64 Ag/AgCl active electrodes
sampled at 512 Hz using Biosemi equipment 4. The electrodes
were placed according to the International 10/20 system. The
electrodes measured all frequencies between 0 and 512 Hz. Two
electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoids and four
4 see www.biosemi.com
electro-oculogram (EOG) electrodes were placed in bipolar pairs
above and below the left eye and on the outer sides of both eyes.
The neural data was analyzed using Fieldtrip 5.
The EEG data was preprocessed using the following steps:
1. Data was sliced in epochs of 10 s before to 5 s after action onset
(i.e., button press), so the data was time locked to action onset
(at 0 s).
2. Data is downsampled to 256 Hz.
3. Trials in which the participant acted within 4 s after trial start
were removed to ensure a decent baseline period.
4. Trials in which a probe was presented between 4.5 and 2.5 s
before action onset were removed to ensure a decent baseline
period.
5. Data of all conditions was concatenated per participant.
6. Data was rereferenced using a linked-mastoid reference.
7. Baseline correction was performed per trial and electrode by
subtracting the average EEG signal between 3.5 and 2.5 s prior
to action onset.
8. EOG artifacts were removed using a linear decorrelation of the
recorded EEG and EOG (Gratton, 1998).
9. A band-pass filter between 0.2 and 47 Hz was used to filter out
slow drifts and 50 Hz line noise.
10. Epochs of -5 to 3 s around action onset were retained.
11. Bad channels were removed if they differed more than 3.5
standard deviation in power from the median across all
channels.
12. Bad epochs were removed if they differed more than 3.5
standard deviation in power from the median across all trials.
13. Bad channel rejection was repeated.
14. A spherical spline interpolation was used to reconstruct bad
channels (Perrin et al., 1989).
To quantify hypotheses 1 and 2 (see Section 2), individual Event-
Related Potentials (ERPs) were calculated per participant and per
condition. To assess the main effects of the requirement of an
introspection report and the presence of probes on the RP, mean
ERPs were calculated across the following conditions:
1. Control and sound: providing information about all conditions
without introspection reports.
2. Introspect and probe: providing information about all
conditions with introspection reports.
3. Control and introspect: providing information about all
conditions without probes.
4. Sound and probe: providing information about all conditions
with probes.
Two within-subject cluster permutation tests with 1000
permutations were used to assess whether the last 2.5 s of data
prior to action onset differed between these grouped conditions:
introspection vs. no introspection and no probe vs. probe
conditions (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). After a Bonferroni
correction, the significance level was set to 0.025/2 = 0.013 for a
two-sided significance test. If significant main effects were found,
post-hoc within-subject cluster permutation tests were used to
identify significant differences between individual experimental
5see www.fieldtriptoolbox.org
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conditions. The significance level of these individual tests was set
to .025 for a two-sided significance test.
Data from the probe condition was used to analyze the
RP prior to ignored and vetoed probes, since this was the
only condition that contained both ignore and veto responses
to probes. From this data, four types of trials were extracted
(see Figure 5):
1. Action-without-probe: trials in which no probe occurred and
an action was performed at least 4 s after trial start (to ensure
a decent baseline).
2. Ignore: trials in which a probe occurred at least 4 s after trial
start and was followed by an action more than 0.5 s later
(which was determined as the point of no return, as shown
in Section 4.1.2).
3. Veto: trials in which a probe occurred at least 4 s after trial start
and was followed by a veto (i.e., no action). The veto response
was confirmed by the answer to the veto question at the end of
the trial.
4. Incorrect action: trials in which a probe occurred at least 4 s
after trial start and was followed by an action within 0.5 s.
According to Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008), vetos should
consistently be performed across a specific time range prior to
action onset. Moreover, this time range should coincide with
the build-up of the RP (Verbaarschot et al., 2016). If this is the
case, we expect to find a weak RP signature prior to vetoed
probes and no RP prior to ignored probes (see Figure 6). To
test this, action-without-probe trials were time-locked to the
performed button press, whereas the ignore, veto and incorrect
action trials were time-locked to probe onset. To extract the
general signature of the RP (i.e., a negative potential relative to
baseline), the mean activities during the last 1.5 s to 0.5 s and
0.5 s to 0 s prior to action or probe onset were calculated per
participant at electrode Cz. These two time intervals were used
to assess whether there are differences in the early and/or late
phase of the RP between these different trial types (Shibasaki and
Hallett, 2006). For the two time intervals, two-sided dependent
samples t-tests were used to test whether the activity differs
significantly between action-without-probe and incorrect action
trials and action-without-probe and veto trials (Bonferroni
corrected at 0.025/8 = 0.003). A further one-sided dependent
samples t-tests were used to test for both time intervals whether
the activity was more negative in veto and action-without-
probe trials relative to ignore trials (Bonferroni corrected
at 0.05/8 = 0.006).
To quantify hypotheses 1 and 2 (see Section 2), individual
alpha/beta ERDs were assessed. For this reason, the data of all
conditions was concatenated and a spectogram was calculated
between –5 and 3 s around action onset. Frequencies of
interest were defined from 5 to 30 Hz using 2 Hz bins. A
flexible Hanning window was used such that it included at
least 7 cycles of each frequency of interest. The data was
baselined using a relative baseline, resulting in the relative
signal change compared to baseline (where a value of 1 means
no change). The baseline activity was defined per electrode,
frequency and trial as the median power between 3.5 and
2.5 s prior to action. Subsequently, the data was separated
into the different conditions. The ERD was calculated per
participant by taking the median power across trials for each
electrode, frequency and trial. Mean ERDs were calculated
per participant for no introspection (control and sound) vs.
introspection conditions (introspect and probe), and no probe
(control and introspect) vs. probe conditions (i.e., sound and
probe). Within-subject cluster permutation tests (Maris and
Oostenveld, 2007) with 1000 permutations were used to
assess whether the last 2.5 s of data prior to action onset
differed between the no introspection vs. introspection and
no probe vs. probe conditions. After a Bonferroni correction,
the significance level was set to 0.025/2 = 0.013. When a
significant main effect was found, post-hoc within-subject cluster
permutation tests were used to identify significant differences
between individual experimental conditions. The significance
level of these individual tests was set to .025 for a two-sided
significance test.
FIGURE 5 | Schematic timeline of events that could happen within a trial of the probe condition. The “+” indicates trial start. Each probe trial could develop in one of
four ways. (1) Ignore: a probe is presented when the participant is not intending to act. The participant ignores the probe and presses the button at a later point in time
when he/she feels the intention to do so. (2) Veto: a probe is presented when the participant experiences an intention to act. The participant vetos his/her action and
waits for the trial to end. (3) Incorrect action: a probe is presented when the participant experiences an intention to act. The probe happens so close to action onset,
that the participant is unable to veto his/her action and presses the button anyway. (4) Action-without-probe: the participant presses a button when he/she feels the
intention to do so. They are uninterrupted by a probe. The darker colored portions of each row indicate the portion of the trial that is used for EEG analysis. This
portion is either time-locked to probe (ignore, veto and incorrect action trials) or action onset (action-without-probe trials).
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FIGURE 6 | The top plot shows a schematic grand average of the distribution of scheduled and ignored probes relative to action onset. The difference between the
scheduled and ignored probe distribution, as highlighted in dark gray, shows the time points at which participants are expected to perform a veto in response to a
probe. The gap provides an estimated time period during which participants are expected to be aware of their intention to act. The bottom plot shows a schematic
grand average of the expected RP. When looking at the average brain activity prior to an action, a full RP is expected to be present. When looking at the average brain
activity prior to an ignored probe, no RP is expected. The analysis window prior to a vetoed probe is expected to sample the early phase of the RP, which given the
shape of the RP will look like a weaker version of the full RP.
4. RESULTS
The raw data supporting the conclusions of this manuscript will
be made available by the authors, without undue reservation, to
any qualified researcher.
4.1. Behavioral Data
4.1.1. Questionnaire
A total of 14 participants completed the questionnaire at the
end of the experiment (see Section 3.2). Due to the exclusion
of some participants (see Section 3.1), the answers of a total
of 12 participants were analyzed. All 12 participants indicated
that the differences between the control, sound, introspect and
probe conditions were clear. Eleven participants indicated that
they acted spontaneously during the entire experiment, i.e., they
pressed the button as soon as they wanted to. In contrast,
1 participant indicated that he/she did not act spontaneously,
i.e., he/she already decided to act long before they pressed
the button.
Six participants always experienced a clear difference in timing
between an intention and action, whereas 1 participant only
experienced this sometimes and 1 other participant only had
this experience when he/she perceived the intention consciously
and vividly. One participant experienced the intention as always
occurring prior to the action. Three participants did not
experience any difference in timing between the intention and
action and perceived them as occurring at the same time.
Concerning the sound and probe conditions, 7 participants
reported the probes as neutral: they did not experience any
positive or negative effects caused by the probes. However,
5 participants experienced some negative effects from the
probes as they reported them to be “annoying” (2 participants),
“stressful” (2 participants), or as “disturbing their relaxed state”
(1 participant). Moreover, 9 participants believe that the probes
did influence their course of action, whereas 3 participants did
not experience any influence of the probes.
During the probe condition, 8 participants found it sometimes
difficult to judge whether or not they were experiencing an
intention to act when a probe was presented. One participant
always experienced this intention assessment as difficult and
3 participants had no trouble with it at all. Eight participants
followed instructions correctly and vetoed their intended
movement when they experienced an intention to act upon
probe presentation, whereas another 2 participants did not use
any particular strategy to decide whether or not they could
press the button after a probe was presented. Two participants
determined whether or not they should veto their act based
on their expectation of a probe. Whenever they were expecting
a probe and a probe was presented, they would veto their
subsequent act. In their case, the performed veto’s did not
relate to their intention to act but to their expectation of a
probe. Because these participants were effectively not following
instructions correctly, they were excluded from further analysis
(as indicated in Section 2.1).
In summary, 92% of the participants who completed the
questionnaire acted spontaneously throughout the experiment.
Although 75% of the participants at least sometimes perceived
their intentions and actions as two different events in time,
75% of participants also found it difficult to assess upon probe
presentation whether or not they were intending to act. Lastly,
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the probes seem to be experienced in a negative way by at least
42% of participants.
4.1.2. Intention Reports
Each participant completed 100 trials of the introspect condition.
Twenty-three (=1%) trials across all participants ended without
a button press. Participants reported having experienced their
intention as “vivid and conscious” in 45% (±2%) of all
trials containing an action. In 34% (±1%) the intention was
experienced as a “vague feeling of wanting.” In the remaining
21% (±1%), participants reported to have “pressed the button
without thinking about it.” Figure 7A shows the reports on the
subjective experience of intending to act for each participant and
across all participants.
Similar to the introspect condition, 100 trials were collected
per participant in the probe condition. In 63% (±1%) of
all trials across participants, a probe was presented. Seventy-
eight% (±16%) of the presented probes across participants
were followed by an ignore response, whereas 20% (±14%)
was followed by a veto response. Three % (±5%) of the
presented probes were followed neither by an ignore or a veto
response; the trial simply ended before an action was made.
Figure 7B shows the number of ignore and veto responses for
each participant and the percentage of these responses across
all participants.
Figures 8A,B show the number of observed ignored probes
and scheduled probes relative to action onset across all
participants for the probe and sound conditions. As noted
in Section 3.5, the distribution of observed ignored probes
will always differ a bit from the distribution of scheduled
probes since the scheduled probes are an approximation
of the observed probes: i.e., the predicted amount of
probes that on average should occur prior to action onset.
Furthermore, the distribution of ignored probes includes
the amount of probes that are presented and followed
by an action only, whereas the distribution of scheduled
probes also includes probes that are not followed by an
action (i.e., a veto).
Since our probes do not follow a uniform but a truncated
normal distribution, our plot looks slightly different from those
of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). Similar to Matsuhashi and
Hallett (2008), we observe a significant decrease in the fraction
of ignored probes between 1.4 and 0.65 s prior to action
(p < 0.0015) for the probe condition. During this time period,
participants mostly performed a veto in response to a presented
probe. Shortly prior to action, from 0.5 s to action onset, the
fraction of ignored probes increases again. This increase could
be due to the point of no return as defined by Matsuhashi and
Hallett (2008). At the point of no return, a probe was presented
in such close proximity to action onset that participants are not
able to cancel their action anymore to perform a veto. As shown
in Figure 8C, the distribution of presented probes of the sound
condition also shows a slight decrease in the amount of probes
between 1 and 0.5s prior to action. However, this deviation
between the scheduled and presented probes was not found to
be significant.
4.1.3. Action Distribution
Across all participants, the mean onset of muscle activation
was found at 81 ms (±78ms) prior to a button press. Since
FIGURE 7 | (A) Reported experience of an intention to act in the introspect condition. Participants could report their intention to act after every trial as “vivid and
conscious,” “a vague feeling of wanting,” or “pressed the button without thinking about it.” The number of times each possible answer was selected is shown per
participant. The percentage of each selected answer across all participants is shown in the pie chart in the top right corner. (B) Overview of the responses to a probe
in the probe condition. The number of times a presented probe is followed by an ignore or a veto response is shown for each participant. The percentage of presented
probes that were followed by an ignore or veto response across all participants is shown in the pie chart in the top right corner. The gap in the pie chart shows the
percentage of presented probes that were ignored but not followed by an action (i.e., the participant did not intend to act during the trial).
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FIGURE 8 | (A) The mean and standard deviation of the ignored probes across all participants in the probe condition. (B) In gray the mean number of probes that
were scheduled to be presented prior to action across all participants in the probe condition (standard deviations across participants are provided on top of the
histogram). In purple the mean number of probes that were ignored and followed by an action (at time 0) across all participants. Around –1.4 s prior to action,
participants start to veto their action in response to a probe: this is apparent by the decrease in the observed fraction of probes that were followed by an action
compared to the scheduled fraction of probes. Around –0.5 s prior to action, participants are no longer able to veto their action in response to a probe due to their
close proximity in time (i.e., point of no return), hence the increase in ignored probes. Note: the purple distribution of ignored probes in (B) is identical to that in (A), but
with a different scaling factor. Significant (p < 0.0015) differences between the amount of scheduled and ignored probes are indicated with an asterisk (*). (C) In gray
the mean number of probes that were scheduled to be presented prior to action across all participants in the sound condition. In green the mean number of probes
that were actually presented and followed by an action (at time 0) across all participants.
this difference is small relative to the magnitude of the
expected intention reports (about 1 s) and estimation errors, the
timing of the button press is used as action onset throughout
the analysis.
A boxplot of the action times of the control (mean: 7.501
s, standard deviation: 1.549 s), sound (mean: 7.180 s, standard
deviation: 1.447 s), introspect (mean: 7.720 s, standard deviation:
1.618 s) and probe (mean: 7.179 s, standard deviation: 1.493
s) conditions across all participants is shown in Figure 9A. A
significant main effect of the presence of probes on the mean
action time was found (df = 15, F = 15.704, p = 0.0013).
Individual post-hoc tests reveal that this is due to significant
differences between the probe and control (df = 15, t =
−3.100, p = 0.007), sound and introspect (df = 15, t =
3.823, p = 0.002), and probe and introspect conditions (df =
15, t = −4.199, p = .000). No significant main effect of the
requirement of an introspection report on mean action time
was found (df = 15, F = 3.291, p = 0.090). Furthermore, no
significant main effects of the requirement of an introspection
report or the presence of probes was found on the standard
deviation of action times.
Furthermore, the effect of the presence of a probe on
action timing was explicitly investigated by comparing the
action timings relative to probe onset across all conditions.
A boxplot of the action timings relative to probe onset of
the control (mean: 0.886 s, standard deviation: 1.801 s), sound
(mean: 0.574 s, standard deviation: 1.704 s) and introspect
(mean: 1.110 s, standard deviation: 1.840 s) conditions across
all participants is shown in Figure 9B. Again, the mean action
time of the sound condition was found to differ significantly
from that of the introspect (df = 15, t = 3.8226, p =
.002∗) condition. No significant differences in mean action
time were found between the control and introspect or
control and sound conditions. No significant differences in the
standard deviation of action times were found between any of
the conditions.
4.2. Brain Data
After preprocessing, 85 (minimum: 40, maximum: 91) trials
remained for analysis of the control condition, 85 (minimum: 46,
maximum: 92) trials for the sound, 87 (minimum: 48, maximum:
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FIGURE 9 | (A) Boxplot of action times per condition across all participants. Action times are measured relative to trial start. (B) Boxplot of action times per condition
across all participants. Action times are measured relative to probe presentation. Significant differences (p < 0.025 for A and p < 0.008 for B) between conditions are
indicated with an asterisk (*).
96) trials for the introspect and 75 (minimum: 28, maximum: 89)
trials for the probe condition.
4.2.1. Readiness Potential
Figure 10 shows the grand average of the RP for conditions with
and without introspection reports and with and without probes.
Visually, the RP seems to have its earliest onset around 2 s prior
to movement. The shape and timing of the RP confirm previous
research involving spontaneous voluntary right handmovements
(Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki and
Hallett, 2006). Significant main effects of the requirement of an
introspection report and the presence of probes are found on
the last 2.5 s of the RP (N = 16, p < 0.008, see Figure 10).
Whereas probes seem to cause a slight increase in RP amplitude,
the requirement of an introspection report seems to cause a slight
decrease in RP amplitude. The introspect condition seems to lie at
the heart of these effects, as the RPs in this condition were found
to differ significantly from those in all other conditions (N = 16,
p < 0.025). Figure 11 shows the grand average of the RP for each
individual condition.
After action onset, the RP of the introspect condition deviates
from the others (see Figure 11). This is due to a difference in
events after action onset: immediately after action performance
in the introspect condition, participants are prompted with a
question about the vividness of their intention to act and need
to respond to this question by pressing one of three buttons.
Concerning the post-hoc analysis of the RP prior to vetoed
and ignored probes, Figure 12 shows the grand average ERP for
different trials of the probe condition. The number of ignored
and vetoed probes differ greatly among participants within this
condition (see Section 4.1.2). Especially the number of vetoed
probes is quite low: around 20%. For this reason, we removed
some participants from further analysis: only those participants
who retained at least 10 trials action-without-probe, ignore and
veto trials were kept for further analysis. This resulted in a
total of 8 participants containing on average 39 (minimum: 30,
maximum: 53) action-without-probe trials, 25 (minimum: 19,
maximum: 32) ignore trials, 15 (minimum: 10, maximum: 20)
veto trials and 11 (minimum: 5, maximum: 18) incorrect action
trials per participant.
Figure 12A shows a clear negativity across the motor cortex
for the action-without-probe and incorrect action trials. This
is to be expected since both trial types include an intended
action and thus should look similar to the RP in Figure 11. The
incorrect action trials are a weaker version of the action-without-
probe trials because they contain less data and are time-locked
to probe onset rather than action onset. As the RP increases in
amplitude up to action at 0 s, time-locking to earlier times in
the RP development results in reduced ERP amplitudes, as seen
here for the incorrect action trials where probes occur randomly
somewhere in the last 0.5 s before action onset. The veto trials
show a medium and more widespread negativity across the
motor cortex, whereas this negativity seems completely absent for
ignore trials. A similar trend can be observed from Figure 12B:
a clear negativity (i.e., RP) can be observed for action-without-
probe trials, whereas ignore trials remain around baseline. Veto
trials (which we expect are randomly sampled from –1.4 to –
0.65 s before action based on the intention-window identified in
Figure 8) are in between ignore and action-without-probe trials,
showing a medium negativity shortly prior to probe onset.
One-sided dependent samples t-tests showed that the action-
without-probe trials are significantly higher in amplitude
compared to the ignore trials during both the early (–1.5 to –
0.5 s: df = 7, t = −3.5217, p = .005) and late (–0.5 to 0 s:
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FIGURE 10 | (A) Grand average readiness potential at electrode Cz for conditions without (control + introspect) and with probes (sound + probe). (B) Grand average
readiness potential at electrode Cz for conditions without (control + sound) and with intention reports (introspect + probe). Action onset is at time 0 and is indicated by
a vertical line. The colored shade indicates the standard error across participants. The topoplots show the grand average EEG activity at each electrode, averaged
across the last 0.5s prior to action onset. Significant differences (p < 0.013) are indicated by a gray box. Note, the data is baselined between 3.5 and 2.5 s prior to
action, as indicated by a small horizontal line in the bottom left corner of each plot.
FIGURE 11 | (A) Topoplot showing the grand average EEG activity at each electrode, averaged across the last 0.5s prior to action onset. (B) Grand average of the
readiness potential at electrode Cz. Each color shows the grand average RP of a single condition surrounded by two lines, indicating the standard error across
participants. Action onset is at time 0 and is indicated by a vertical line. Note, the data is baselined between 3.5 and 2.5 s prior to action, as indicated by a small
horizontal line in the bottom left corner of plot B. The introspect condition was found to differ significantly from all others (p < 0.025).
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FIGURE 12 | (A) Topoplot showing the grand average EEG activity of the
probe condition averaged across the last 0.5s prior to action
(action-without-probe trials) or probe onset (ignore, veto, or incorrect action
trials). (B) Grand average ERP at electrode Cz. Each color shows the grand
average RP of a single trial type surrounded by the standard error across
participants. For simplicity, we leave out the incorrect trials, since they closely
resemble the action-without-probe trials. Time 0 corresponds to action
(action-without-probe trials) or probe (ignore or veto) onset and is indicated by
a vertical line. A significant difference between action-without-probe and
ignore trials was found across –1.5 to 0 s. Note, the data is baselined between
3.5 and 2.5 s prior to action or probe onset, as indicated by a small horizontal
line in the bottom left corner of plot (B).
df = 7, t = −5.4562, p = 0.001) phase of the RP. No significant
differences were found between the action-without-probe and
incorrect action trials (df = 7, t = −0.3285, p = 0.752), action-
without-probe and veto trials (df = 7, t = −1.928, p = 0.095)
or veto and ignore trials (df = 7, t = −1.014, p = 0.172) for the
early phase of the RP. Similarly, no significant differences were
found between the action-without-probe and incorrect action
trials (df = 7, t = −0.4593, p = 0.670), action-without-probe
and veto trials (df = 7, t = −1.969, p = 0.090) or veto and ignore
trials (df = 7, t = −2.587, p = 0.018) for the late phase of the RP.
Figure 12 also shows differences between action-without-
probe, ignore, veto and incorrect action trials after time 0s. Note
however, that time 0 s refers to action onset for action-without-
probe trials only and to probe onset for ignore, veto and incorrect
action trials. Therefore, any differences after time 0s likely reflect
the presence of an action or probe (or the combination of the two
for incorrect action trials). We do not investigate brain activity
after time 0 s because any differences in brain processing related
to action preparation will be contaminated by the brain response
to probe presentation or action performance.
4.2.2. Alpha/Beta Event-Related Desynchronization
Significant main effects of the requirement of an introspection
report and the presence of probes are found on the last 2.5 s
of the RP (N = 16, p < 0.013, see Figure 13). Figure 14
shows the grand average of the ERD across the alpha (8–
12Hz) and beta (13–30Hz) bands at channel C3 for each
condition. An ERD is visible in the average time-frequency
spectrum prior and during action (time 0). The ERD seems
to have its earliest onset at around 2 s prior to action onset.
Judging from the topoplot provided in Figure 14A, the ERD
seems enhanced in the introspect and especially probe conditions
compared to the control and sound conditions. After action,
an event-related synchonization is visible in the control, sound
and probe conditions, whereas the ERD seems to continue
after movement in the introspect condition. This continued
ERD in the introspect condition is caused by the second
button press that is required to answer the multiple-choice
question on the subjective experience of the intention to act.
Overall, the shape and timing of the observed ERD and ERS
signatures confirm those of previous research (Pfurtscheller and
Aranibar, 1979; Doyle et al., 2005). Individual post-hoc tests
reveal significant differences in the ERD between the probe and
sound, probe and control, and introspect and control conditions
(N = 16, p < 0.025).
5. DISCUSSION
The probe method of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) promises
to be a valuable addition to the clock method of Libet et al.
(1983) in studying the timing of an intention to act. Here, it
was put to test to verify its accuracy and quantify any potential
concerns that might limit its usage. In a 2 × 2 within-subject
design (1) the requirement of an introspection report and (2)
the presence of an auditory probe were manipulated. In total, the
experiment consisted of 4 conditions: control, sound, introspect
and probe. In all conditions, participants were instructed to make
a spontaneous self-paced right hand movement between 5 and
10 s after trial start. The control condition consisted solely of the
performance of these voluntary actions. In addition, the sound
and probe conditions contained (identical) auditory probes.
Furthermore, the introspect and probe conditions required a
report on the experienced intention to act. In the introspect
condition, this report was provided by answering a multiple-
choice question on the vividness of an experienced intention.
In the probe condition, it was provided through the response
to a probe: ignoring the probe or vetoing the intended action.
In addition, 14 participants completed a questionnaire to
get more insight into their subjective experience during the
experiment. The effect of the two manipulated variables on
the neural preparatory activity for action (RP and alpha/beta
ERD), the awareness of an intention, and the performed actions
was investigated.
The presence of probes had a significant effect on the observed
mean action times. This effect was due to significant differences
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FIGURE 13 | Topoplots showing the grand average power across 8–30 Hz at each electrode, averaged across the last 0.5 s prior to action onset. Averages across
conditions with (sound + probe) and without probes (control + introspect), and with (introspect + probe) and without intention reports (control + sound) are shown. A
significant difference (p < 0.013) is found between conditions with and without intention reports.
FIGURE 14 | (A) Topoplot showing the grand average power across 8-30Hz at each electrode, averaged across the last 0.5s prior to action onset. (B) Grand average
of the event-related desynchronization across the alpha (8–1 2Hz) and beta (13–30 Hz) bands measured at electrode C3. Each spectogram corresponds to the grand
average data of an individual condition: control (left), sound (left of middle), introspect (right of middle) and probe (right). The dotted vertical line indicates action onset
(time 0). The data is baselined between 3.5 and 2.5 s prior to action, as indicated by the horizontal line in the bottom left corner.
in mean action time between the sound and introspect, control
and probe, and probe and introspect conditions. Regardless of the
requirement of an introspection report, the presence of probes
seem to speed up the mean action time by roughly 0.3 s. One
possible explanation for this observation is that the action times
get tuned toward the probe distribution. The probe distribution
is designed to be a shifted version of the action distribution.
On average, this shift causes the probes to be presented slightly
prior to the actions. This precedence of probes could bias the
actions by speeding them up. Although a significant difference is
found between the control and probe conditions, it was not found
between the control and sound condition. On the one hand, this
may be due to the fact that the sampling of actions in the probe
condition slightly enhances the effect of the probes: slow actions
are more likely to be turned into a veto response due to a probe.
Because these slow actions will not be performed, they do not add
to the mean action time. This enhances the difference between
mean action onset in the probe compared to the sound condition.
On the other hand, this result may also confirm hypothesis 5:
veto influences action. Participants may act faster in the probe
condition because they want to either explicitly (consciously)
or implicitly (subconsciously) decrease the chance of having to
perform a veto.
When specifically investigating the effect of the probes on the
action times, the mean action times relative to probe onset of the
sound condition were found to differ from those of the introspect
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condition. However, the action times relative to probe onset did
not differ significantly between the sound and control nor the
introspect and control conditions, suggesting that the difference
between the sound and introspect conditions are a combined
effect from the relatively slower action times in the introspect
condition and faster action times of the sound condition.
Although probes seem to speed up actions, they do not seem
to speed up brain signals. In contrast, it is not the presence
of probes, but the requirement of an introspection report that
seems to influence brain signals: reducing the amplitude of
the RP and increasing the desynchronization in the alpha and
beta bands prior to action onset. Specifically, the RPs in the
introspect condition have the lowest amplitude of all. This
may suggest that the introspection requirement influences the
threshold for action performance, making one more susceptible
to small fluctuations in neural activity. Moreover, performing
introspection may enhance the level of attention, which reduces
the general level of alpha activity and could cause a relatively
enhanced desynchronization in this range. These types of effects
of introspection, i.e., tuning attention toward ones internal state,
have been reported to induce changes in brain activity in the past
(Lau et al., 2007).
Nine out of 12 participants who completed the questionnaire
indicated that they found it difficult to assess whether or not
they were intending to act upon probe presentation in the probe
condition. Yet, vetos were performed in a specific time range
across all participants: running from 1.4 until 0.65 s prior to
action onset. Finding a significant descrease in the amount
of ignored probes during this time range confirms the main
behavioral findings of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). Moreover,
within the probe condition, we found a significant difference
in brain activity prior to an ignored probe and an action: we
see a clear RP prior to action onset, but nothing like an RP
prior to an ignored probe. This suggests that there is no neural
preparatory activity for action present prior to an ignored probe,
providing further evidence indicating that participants are indeed
not experiencing an intention to act when they ignore a probe.
The average onset of the awareness of an intention to act found
here and in previous research (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008;
Verbaarschot et al., 2016) is much earlier than that found by
studies using the clock method (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard and
Eimer, 1999; Haggard et al., 2002; Sirigu et al., 2004; Banks and
Isham, 2009; Bode et al., 2011; Fried et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2013;
Jo et al., 2014; Douglas et al., 2015; Tabu et al., 2015; Alexander
et al., 2016). This suggests that probes spread out the awareness
of an intention to act. During a specific time range prior to
action (starting around 1.4 s before), probes seem to facilitate
the awareness of an intention. Within this time range, probes are
consistently followed by a veto response across all participants. As
argued previously (Uithol et al., 2014; Verbaarschot et al., 2016),
these findings suggests that an intention to act reflects a dynamic
process rather than a discrete mental state. The probe method
is able to measure the awareness of intending during the earlier
stages of this process, during which one seems susceptible to
external stimuli. In contrast, the clock method seems to measure
only its final stage, during which intentions become available for
self-initiated report.
The probe distribution is designed to present the majority
of probes in the last 3s prior to action onset, where awareness
of an intention is most likely to occur (Matsuhashi and Hallett,
2008; Verbaarschot et al., 2016). The choice of probe distribution
may co-determine the results: awareness of an intention to act
starting earlier than 3s prior to action onset may be missed
using our probe distribution. We believe our choice of probe
distribution should be sufficient since our results as well as
those of Matsuhashi and Hallett and Verbaarschot et al. show
that probes are consistently followed by a veto response starting
from 1.5s prior to action onset, and not earlier. If needed,
the probe distribution could be extended in future research to
investigate earlier awareness of an intention to act. If one would
want to measure the timing of an intention to act across a
larger time period, one would need to extend the experiment
in order to retain a similar time resolution: a fixed amount of
probes with small variations in timing provides a more detailed
approximation of the timing of an intention to act during a
limited time period, than the same amount of probes with big
variations in timing across a larger time period.
Eleven out of 12 participants who completed the questionnaire
indicated that they acted spontaneously throughout the
experiment. Although participants were instructed to act
whenever they experienced an intention to do so, only 45% of
these intentions were reported as vivid and conscious across
all participants in the introspect condition. The remaining
intentions were either perceived as a vague feeling of wanting
(34%) or without any conscious thought at all (21%). These
results might be related to the type of task that participants were
asked to perform: an arbitrary button press that is performed
without any reason or consequence. In daily life, these actions
are usually not preceded by a vivid intention. This type of task
has been criticized in the past (Mele, 2010; Nachev and Hacker,
2014) and highlights the importance of designing an ecologically
valid experiment that aims to measure meaningful actions
(Mecacci and Haselager, 2015). In contrast to the clock method,
the probe method can be used to reach this goal as it does not
require constant introspection and can be used in combination
with other stimuli. Additional stimuli can be used to create an
ecologically valid experimental context in which actions can be
made for a reason and have some consequence.
We used trial-by-trial color feedback rather than a sporadic
verbal correction [as most probably used by Matsuhashi and
Hallett (2008)] to prevent potential instructional differences
between participants. In addition, the feedback was designed to
provide an intuitive feeling of the time window of opportunity
for acting without the need to keep track of time. However,
the feedback may have enhanced the artificial nature of the
experimental task and decreased the element of spontaneity
in comparison to that of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008). In a
previous study we conducted a Matsuhashi style experiment
without the use of color feedback (Verbaarschot et al., 2016).
Participants had complete freedom to decide when to act and
what action (a left or right hand button press) to perform.
In our current study, we observed a similar action pattern to
that of our previous Matsuhashi style experiment in terms of
action mean and variance across all conditions. As we believe
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that action variance increases with spontaneity, this suggests
that the actions measured in this experiment are at least as
spontaneous as those measured in our previous Matsuhashi type
experiment that did not use any color feedback. Moreover, since
participants acted around 5-7 s after trial start in the previous
Matsuhashi experiment, the 5–10 s window of opportunity used
in the current experiment does not seem to restrict the average
participant’s spontaneous actions in an obvious way (Verleger
et al., 2016). In future research, we encourage the use of a more
ecologically valid task that evokes the required action timing
and pattern in a natural and intuitive way without the use of
explicit feedback.
In summary, our test of the probe method has confirmed
certain effects of the presence of probes and the requirement of an
introspection report: probes speed up actions and introspection
changes the neural preparation for action. However, we do
not believe that these effects make the probe method an
unsuitable alternative to the clock method to study the timing
of intentions to act. The RP and alpha/beta ERD were clearly
detectable in all experimental conditions, confirming previous
findings on the neural preparation for a voluntary movement
(Pfurtscheller and Aranibar, 1979; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki
and Hallett, 2006). Moreover, vetos were performed consistently
across participants from 1.4 to 0.65 s prior to action onset.
Together with previous research, this time range has been
confirmed in three independent investigations (Matsuhashi and
Hallett, 2008; Verbaarschot et al., 2016). Probes do seem to
affect the timing of actions, speeding them up a bit (about
300 ms on average compared to the control condition). But
they do not seem to speed up or delay brain signals. The
requirement of an introspection report does influence the brain
signals. However, this effect is common to both the probe
and clock methods, as they both require introspection reports.
Moreover, the continuous introspection, as required by the clock
method and mimicked by the introspect condition, seems to
exacerbate these effects as shown by the lower amplitude RP and
enhanced desynchronization in the alpha and beta bands prior to
action onset.
We believe that the probe method provides a valuable
addition to the clock method. The probe method can be used
in combination with other tactile, visual, or even auditory (if
the probe is easily detectable) stimuli, creating the possibility to
embed it in a more realistic and ecologically valid experimental
task. By including it in our repertoire, intentional actions can
be studied in various experimental contexts. In contrast to
the clock method, the probe method measures the awareness
of an intention to act in real-time during action preparation.
As such, it requires only sporadic introspection. Moreover,
the probe method seems capable of measuring earlier stages
of intending compared to the clock method. Depending on
one’s research objective, one might favor the clock or probe
method over the other. When the amount of experimental
time needs to be limited and one is interested in the onset
of a reportable intention to act, one might best opt for
the clock method. On the other hand, when devising a
complex and ecologically valid experimental task and one is
interested in the time period during which one is aware of
an intention to act, the probe method seems the best way to
go. With this overview and our current findings, we hope to
encourage the use of Matsuhashi and Hallet’s probe method
in future research and extend the repertoire for experimentally
studying intended action.
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